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T IS NATURAL TO SUPPOSE THAT IF AN AGENT is unable, due 
to features of human nature, to bring herself to perform some act, then 
this suffices to block or negate the claim that the agent ought or is required 
to act in that way. Call this the Human Nature Constraint. David Estlund (2011) 
has recently mounted a forceful attack on this apparent piece of com-
monsense. 
First, Estlund suggests that there are cases in which agents are required 
to do things that they cannot bring themselves to do. In particular, he offers 
the case of Selfish Bill: 
 
Suppose Bill pleads that he is not required to refrain from dumping because he is 
motivationally unable to bring himself to do it. There is no special phobia, compul-
sion, or illness involved. He is simply deeply selfish and so cannot thoroughly will 
to comply. Dumping his trash by the road is easier than wrapping it properly and 
putting it by the curb or taking it to the dump. He wishes he had more willpower, 
and yet he doesn’t have it. Refraining is something he could, in all other respects, 
easily do, except that he can’t thoroughly will to do it. It would be silly for Bill to 
propose this as requirement-blocking. This motivational incapacity is patently pow-
erless to block the requirement in an individual case (220). 
 
Next, Estlund suggests that there is no reason to alter our normative verdict 
in such cases even if the agent’s inability to bring herself to do that thing is a 
matter of human nature. He writes: 
 
[E]ven if the inability is not requirement-blocking in an individual case, what about 
if it is typical of humans, or even of humans as such? I see no reason to say any-
thing other than that … [i]f S’s being unable to will Ø is not requirement-blocking, 
then this is still the case if all humans are (even essentially) like S in this respect. … 
[E]ven if the reason people will not comply with [some requirement] is because 
there is a motivational inability to do so that is part of human nature, this is not re-
quirement-blocking … [The] requirement … would not be refuted (220-21). 
 
So, it follows that there are cases in which agents are required to do things 
that they are unable, due to human nature, to bring themselves to do. But if 
there are cases of this kind, then the Human Nature Constraint is flat-out 
false. 
Here is Estlund’s argument: 
 
(1) There are cases in which an agent S is unable to bring herself to Ø and yet is 
required to Ø. 
(2) Whether or not an agent S’s inability to bring herself to Ø is a matter of human 
nature does not make a difference to whether or not S’s inability to bring her-
self to Ø is requirement-blocking. 
 
I 
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Therefore, 
 
(3) There are cases in which an agent S is required to Ø even though she is unable, 
due to features of human nature, to bring herself to Ø. 
 
Therefore, 
 
(4) It is not the case that if an agent S is unable, due to features of human nature, 
to bring herself to Ø, then this suffices to negate the claim that S is required to 
Ø. 
 
I shall argue that Estlund’s objection fails. Most of the critical attention 
has focused on premise (1) (see Gilabert forthcoming; Wiens forthcoming; 
Southwood ms). By contrast, I shall grant (1) for the sake of argument and 
focus instead on premise (2). In particular, I shall argue that premise (2) is 
false given a certain plausible necessary condition on what it takes for a fea-
ture of an agent to be a matter of human nature (section 1), and that it only 
seems plausible insofar as we accept a conception of human nature that we 
should reject (section 2). Finally, I shall suggest that appreciating where 
premise (2) goes wrong gives Estlund resources for a different way of resist-
ing attempts to negate normative claims by appealing to the Human Nature 
Constraint (section 3). 
 
1. 
 
What does it mean to say that some feature of an agent is or is not “a matter 
of human nature?” I have no idea. But here is what I take to be a plausible 
necessary condition: 
 
(5) A feature F of agent S is a matter of human nature only if there is little or 
nothing that S could have done in the past to alter the fact that, now, S is F. 
 
Call this the inalterability claim about human nature.1 Consider our tendency to 
some measure of partiality toward our own children. This is at least a candidate 
to be a matter of human nature – in a way that, say, our unwillingness to turn 
up naked to the office clearly is not. The inalterability claim can explain why: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 An anonymous referee helpfully noted that (5) might seem to fail to capture an important 
aspect of facts about human nature – namely that they are supposed to be or depend on 
“population-level” facts. Of course, (5) only postulates a necessary condition for a feature to 
be a matter of human nature, so it is perfectly consistent with the population-level aspect. But 
I think we can say more than that. Plausibly, there is a population-level analogue of (5), i.e.: 
 
(5*) A feature F of agent S is a matter of human nature only if for all (or almost all) 
human agents a, there is little or nothing that a could have done in the past to 
alter the fact that, now, a is F. 
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There is at least some plausibility to the idea that there is little or nothing we 
could have done in the past to alter the fact that we are now disposed to be 
somewhat partial toward our own children. The psychological mechanisms 
that underlie our partiality toward our children might seem to run deep. Try 
as we might, our chances of achieving the same measure of regard for others’ 
children would appear dim. Or so it might be claimed. Of course, if this 
turns out to be wrong – if instead we could have taken steps in the past to al-
ter our motivational makeup in the present – then we should conclude that 
our tendency to be partial toward our children is not a matter of human na-
ture. The point is that whether this tendency is a matter of human nature 
seems to turn, in part, on whether or not we could have taken steps to alter it 
in the past. 
By contrast, it is clearly not true that there is little or nothing we could 
have done in the past to alter the fact that we are now unwilling to turn up 
naked to the office. This is because unwillingness to turn up naked to the 
office is (largely) due to existing social norms. While such social norms un-
doubtedly exert powerful motivational effects (see Southwood 2011; Bren-
nan, Eriksson, Goodin and Southwood 2013), their grip on us is plausibly 
something that we can alter by concerted effort. Thus, for example, we could 
have made a concerted effort to become sufficiently comfortable with the 
idea of appearing naked in public by consorting with naturists, or to become 
relatively indifferent to the disapproval of others or whatever. 
If the inalterability claim is correct, then it seems that we have what we 
need to show that premise (2) of Estlund’s argument is false. Return to 
Estlund’s example of Selfish Bill. Being a lazy and selfish good-for-nothing, 
Bill is unable to bring himself to refrain from dumping his rubbish. Estlund 
claims that Bill is nonetheless required to refrain from doing so; Bill’s inabil-
ity to bring himself to do otherwise is not requirement-blocking. Let us con-
cede that this is so. 
Next, imagine – implausibly, to be sure – that Bill’s inability to bring 
himself to refrain from dumping his rubbish is a matter of human nature. 
Given the inalterability claim, this means that Bill’s dumping proclivities run 
deep – so deep that there is little or nothing Bill could have done in the past 
to alter the fact that, now, he is unable to bring himself to refrain from 
dumping his rubbish. Even if he had made a concerted effort to change his 
motivational makeup – enrolling in anti-dumping classes, reading up on the 
environmental costs of dumping and so on – he would have been virtually 
certain to remain just as unable to bring himself to refrain from dumping as 
before. In such (admittedly rather far-fetched) circumstances, it seems far 
from obvious that we should say that it remains true that Bill is required to 
refrain from dumping, that he acts wrongly when he dumps. 
But this means that premise (2) is simply false. It is simply not true that 
whether or not an agent’s inability to bring herself to Ø is a matter of human 
nature does not make a difference to whether or not S’s inability to bring 
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herself to Ø is requirement-blocking. It does make a difference. Bill is a case 
in point.2 
 
2. 
 
I have argued that premise (2) of Estlund’s argument is false. But we might 
wonder: Why might it have seemed plausible? 
The answer, I believe, is to be found in the following passage: 
 
Suppose people line up to get your moral opinion on their behavior. Bill is told that 
his selfishness is indeed a motivational incapacity, but that it does not exempt him 
from the requirement to be less selfish. But behind Bill comes Nina with the same 
query. Again, we dispatch her, on the same grounds as Bill. Behind Nina is Kim, 
and so on. Since each poses the same case, our judgment is the same. The line 
might contain all humans, but that fact adds nothing to any individual’s case. I take 
this to show that even if the reason people will not comply with [some require-
ment] is because there is a motivational inability to do so that is part of human na-
ture, this is not requirement-blocking … [The] requirement … would not be refut-
ed. (220-21). 
 
Estlund’s idea seems to be as follows. First, whether or not an agent’s 
inability to bring herself to do something is typical of humans surely does not 
make a difference to whether or not it is requirement-blocking. This seems 
right. If Bill’s inability to bring himself to refrain from dumping is not re-
quirement-blocking in the initial case, then it would be quite bizarre to sug-
gest that it could be requirement-blocking simply because all other humans 
happen to share his objectionable motivational makeup. Second, Estlund 
“take[s] this to show” that whether or not an agent’s inability to bring herself 
to do something is a matter of human nature does not make a difference to 
whether or not it is requirement-blocking. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Here is the argument: 
 
(6) Whether or not Bill’s inability to bring himself to refrain from dumping is a 
matter of human nature is, in part, a matter of whether or not there is little or 
nothing that Bill could have done in the past to alter the fact that, now, he is 
unable to bring himself to refrain from dumping. 
(7) Whether or not there is little or nothing that Bill could have done in the past 
to alter the fact that, now, he is unable to bring himself to refrain from dump-
ing makes a difference to whether or not his inability to bring himself to re-
frain from dumping is requirement-blocking. 
 
Therefore, 
 
(8) Whether or not Bill’s inability to bring himself to refrain from dumping is a 
matter of human nature makes a difference to whether or not his inability to 
bring himself to refrain from dumping is requirement-blocking. 
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Notice, however, that the second claim appears to presuppose a certain 
conception of human nature, namely that: 
 
(9) A feature F of agent S is a matter of human nature if (and only if) F is typical 
of humans. 
 
Call this the typicality conception of human nature. Given the typicality concep-
tion, premise (2) of Estlund’s Human Nature Argument follows straightfor-
wardly. Here is the argument: 
 
(10) Whether or not an agent S’s inability to bring herself to Ø is typical of humans 
does not make a difference to whether or not S’s inability to bring herself to Ø 
is requirement-blocking. 
(11) An agent S’s inability to bring herself to Ø is a matter of human nature if (and 
only if) the inability is typical of humans. 
 
Therefore, 
 
(2) Whether or not an agent S’s inability to bring herself to Ø is a matter of human 
nature does not make a difference to whether or not S’s inability to bring her-
self to Ø is requirement-blocking. 
 
The problem, of course, is that the typicality conception of human na-
ture is false. It is presumably typical of humans that we are unable to bring 
ourselves to turn up naked to the office. That does not mean that it is a mat-
ter of human nature.3 Rather, it is due to the existence of social norms.4 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 An anonymous referee noted that it is open to Estlund to insist that the typicality concep-
tion only postulates a necessary condition for a feature to be a matter of human nature. 
However, as the referee also noted, this does not ultimately help Estlund. For it would be 
palpably fallacious to infer from the claim that satisfying one of the necessary conditions for 
human nature is not requirement-blocking to the claim that being a matter of human nature 
is not requirement-blocking. 
4 It might be objected that it is unfair to Estlund to claim that he is presupposing such a 
manifestly implausible conception of human nature. For recall his claim that “[i]f S’s being 
unable to will Ø is not requirement-blocking, then this is still the case if all humans are (even 
essentially) like S in this respect” (220). The “(even essentially)” suggests that he takes prem-
ise (2) to be true even if we accept the following alternative to the typicality conception of 
human nature: 
 
(12) A feature F of agent S is a matter of human nature if (and only if) F is essen-
tially typical of humans. 
 
Call this the essentialist conception of human nature. In other words, Estlund is claiming that: 
 
(13) Whether or not an agent S’s inability to bring herself to Ø is essentially typical 
of humans does not make a difference to whether or not S’s inability to bring 
herself to Ø is requirement-blocking. 
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3. 
 
I have suggested that Estlund’s objection to the Human Nature Constraint 
fails. I now want to conclude in a more constructive and friendly vein. For I 
believe that the considerations adduced above that show that Estlund is 
wrong to reject the Human Nature Constraint can be mobilized to help show 
that he is nonetheless right to be skeptical about the mode of argumentative 
strategy in which the Human Nature Constraint gets deployed. 
Recall the inalterability claim about human nature, i.e.: 
 
(5) A feature F of agent S is a matter of human nature only if there is little or 
nothing that S could have done in the past to alter the fact that, now, S is F. 
 
This means that in order to refute some normative theory, T, on the basis of 
its violating the Human Nature Constraint, it would have to be shown that: 
 
(14) T requires that some agent S performs some act Ø such that i) S cannot bring 
herself to Ø and ii) there is little or nothing that S could have done in the past 
to alter the fact that, now, she cannot bring herself to Ø. 
 
I shall now suggest that salient cases of this kind will be vanishingly rare. 
Consider a theory that requires us to be considerably more altruistic and 
less selfish than most of us are disposed to be: say, a theory that requires that 
we spend 25 percent of our leisure time helping the less advantaged. Suppose 
that most of us are such that we could not bring ourselves to comply with 
the demands of this theory. Even if this is right, it is surely not right that 
there is little or nothing that we could have done in the past to alter the fact 
that, now, we cannot bring ourselves to comply with the demands of the 
theory. Think of Dickens’ Scrooge. Selfish people are not inalterably selfish. 
They can change, even if, as a matter of fact, they rarely do so.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The problem is that Estlund does not present any argument for (13). Here is what he says 
instead concerning the essentialist conception: 
 
What would it mean for selfishness to be not only typical but essentially typical 
of humans? One possibility is that an agent does not count as human if her 
motivations are otherwise. There are historical examples of people who were 
extremely unselfish, such as Mother Theresa [sic]. The objection we are con-
sidering is this: a theory that requires people to be as unselfish as Mother The-
resa [sic] is false because anyone who is that unselfish does not count as hu-
man. But this is absurd (221). 
 
This may well be true but it is clearly irrelevant to the truth or falsity of (13) – and indeed, 
more generally, to the truth or falsity of the Human Nature Constraint interpreted in light of 
the essentialist conception. Estlund’s remarks bear, not upon the truth or falsity of the Hu-
man Nature Constraint, but rather upon its applicability. 
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What about the case of parental (or some other kind of) partiality that 
might be thought to run deeper? Even if there is little or nothing we could 
have done in the past to alter our tendency to have partial attitudes toward our 
own children – say, a special kind of love and concern – it is quite another 
thing to claim that there is little or nothing we could have done in the past to 
alter the fact that we cannot now bring ourselves to avoid acting partially to-
ward them. 
Perhaps the most plausible cases will involve phobias of various kinds: 
fear of heights, snakes, sharks and so on. Even here, we may question 
whether altering our motivational makeup is really beyond our control. Peo-
ple do, after all, sometimes manage to overcome their phobias. But even if 
this is wrong, and cases of phobias really do fit the bill, it is not clear that 
they are really matters of human nature. Nor are they especially salient. Nor-
mative theories rarely require acrophobes to scale cliffs, ophidiophobes to 
caress dugites and so on. 
Early on in his article Estlund writes: 
 
I will grant for the sake of argument that it is in the nature of humans to be more 
selfish and partial than socialist or egalitarian (or whatever other) theory would 
need them to be. I deny, however, that this refutes any such normative political 
theories. Far from taking a stand on the content of human nature, it would be open 
to me to deny that there is such a thing as human nature at all. But I will grant it for 
the sake of argument. Some have suggested that philosophical criticism is often in 
one or the other of two categories: “Oh yeah?” or “So what?” When a political 
theory is alleged to violate the bounds of human nature, many have responded with 
“Oh yeah?” My response, by contrast, is “So what?” (209). 
 
I think that Estlund should side with the “many” after all. The Human Na-
ture Constraint, even if true, lacks salient application. The best response to 
the charge that a particular normative claim is contrary to human nature is 
“Oh yeah?” rather than “So what?” Getting clear about human nature helps 
to see why.5 
 
Nicholas Southwood 
Australian National University 
School of Philosophy 
nicholas.southwood@anu.edu.au 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft and to 
many friends and colleagues (especially Geoffrey Brennan, David Estlund, Holly Lawford-
Smith and David Wiens) for many fascinating discussions about the issues with which the 
article engages. Research for the article was supported by ARC Discovery Grant 
DP120101507. 
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